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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this article is to present a new theory on the generation of social 
capital. In the discussion about the sources of social capital it has been stressed that 
generalized trust is built up by the citizens themselves through a culture that 
permeates the networks and organizations of civil society. Since this approach lacks a 
micro-theory and has produced only mixed empirical evidence, we like to highlight 
instead how social capital is embedded in and linked to formal political and legal 
institutions. Not all political institutions matter equally, however, in fact we argue that 
trust thrives most in societies with effective, impartial and fair street-level 
bureaucracies. The article presents the causal mechanism between these institutional 
characteristics and generalized trust, and illustrates its validity in a cross-national 
context. 
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Introduction: The Theory of Social Capital 
 
 
The purpose of this article is to present a new theory explaining how social capital is 
generated. The reason for investigating this is the wealth of empirical research showing that 
social capital is associated with a number of political, social, and economic outcomes that for 
most people are normatively desirable. Among these are well-performing democratic 
institutions (Putnam 1993, Newton 1999b, Woolcook 2001), personal happiness (Helliwell 
2002), optimism (Uslaner 2002), economic growth (Knack & Keefer 1997, Zak & Knack 
2001), and democratic stability (Inglehart 1999). The problem is that in this abundance of 
positive associations between social capital and various desired social and political outcomes, 
the sources of social capital often remain under-theorized and empirically unexplored. 
Simply put, if social capital is such an important societal resource, we need to know more 
about how it is generated and maintained.  
 
From a theoretical point of view, social capital has gained interest because it has been 
pointed out as an important resource in the solution of social dilemmas. These problems are 
also known in non-cooperative game theory as “multiple equilibria.”1 Whereas game theory 
has established certain structural aspects of a cooperative game, which foster the emergence 
of cooperation, e.g. the tit-for-tat strategy, or a form of reciprocity combined with the 
perception that a relationship is long-term in character (Axelrod 1984, Scharpf 1997:86, 
Kydd 2000), recent research has also pointed out the importance of generalized trust (Ostrom 
1998, Ziegler 1998, Eckel & Wilson 2003). In social dilemma type of situations, agents 
acting from a utility-based script can reach radically different levels of social/economic 
efficiency depending on the existence of social trust. Even if everyone realizes that 
cooperation would be beneficial for all, it will only come about if the agents trust that (almost 
all) others are going to cooperate (Rothstein 2005). The reasons are well known: Not only 
can cooperation be a costly strategy for the individual, it is also an unlikely strategy if one is 
not convinced that (almost) all other agents are also going to cooperate because the public 
                                                 
1 They are also known as the n-person prisoners’ dilemma, or the problem of collective goods, or the “tragedy of 
the commons.” 
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good that is going to be produced will not come into existence if not enough “others” can be 
trusted to cooperate (Ostrom 1999).  
 
Trust has also been found to be an important resource in social-psychology.  Experimental 
evidence shows fairly conclusively that generalized trust matters for cooperation, especially 
in one-shot situations and in multiple n-person games trusters do give their unknown partners 
a chance (Rotter, 1980; Wrightsman, 1966; Yamagishi, 2001).2 Clearly, generalized trust is 
an advantage to people and societies that possess it, as trusters are more likely to initiate 
cooperative relations, which is beneficial for themselves as well as for their social 
environment.   
 
Social capital has been defined as trust and beyond that as access to and membership in 
various types of networks, as well as norms of reciprocity (Coleman 1990; Putnam 1993). 
We consider the attitudinal aspects of the concept, such as generalized interpersonal trust, to 
be the most important part of social capital. The reason is that individuals can be members of 
networks that consist of untrustworthy agents and/or networks that are held together by 
distrusting agents that are outside the network. There is thus no logical reason why 
membership in networks per se should be a social value. Attitudes of generalized trust extend 
beyond the boundaries of face-to-face interaction and incorporate people who are not 
personally known (Uslaner 2002). These attitudes of trust are generalized when they go 
beyond specific personal settings in which the partner to be cooperated with is already 
known. They even go beyond the boundaries of kinship and friendship, and the boundaries of 
acquaintance. In this sense, the scope of generalized trust should be distinguished from the 
scope of trust toward people one personally knows. When citizens believe that most people 
can be trusted, indicates an evaluation of the moral standard of the society in which they live 
(Delhey and Newton 2005). Living in a society (or working in an organization) with high 
moral standards (i.e. where “people in general” are thought to be trustworthy) is an asset, 
because many forms of transaction costs are reduced or even minimized (Svendsen and 
Svendsen 2004).  
                                                 
2 In repeated games or in games with specific partners, generalized trust is not a discriminating factor in 
determining outcomes, although even in this case, trusters are more likely to give people a second chance (ibid). 
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 Interpersonal generalized trust is usually seen as something that is built up through a culture 
that permeates the networks and organizations of civil society. Because of this historical-
cultuarlist focus, the debate over the sources of social capital has often lost sight of political 
and institutional factors. In particular, the institutional conditions under which social capital 
can grow have remained largely unexplored. For example, Putnam and Goss have stated that 
“(t)he myriad ways in which the state encourages and discourages social-capital formation 
have been under-researched […] Such questions represent some of the many unexplored 
frontiers in social-capital research.” (Putnam & Goss 2001, 17) 
 
The question why it is that citizens in some countries, regions, cities or villages are able to 
trust each other and thereby solve many of their collective action problems while others are 
not, turns out to be one of the most interesting puzzles in the social sciences (Ostrom 1998, 
Krishna 2002). In this article we will address this particular issue in more detail, and sketch 
out a theory of the formation of generalized trust that is embedded in the structure and 
characteristics of political institutions. In fact we argue that many of the effects that social 
capital has been shown to have on institutions might be as much caused by the effects of 
institutional differences on social capital. Thus, our ambition is to build a theory, in which 
the causal logic that is the most common in studies of social capital, is reversed.  
 
This article proceeds in six main sections. In the first two we review current approaches 
explaining the sources of generalized trust, distinguishing the society-centered and the 
institution-centered approaches. In the third section we build on the results of the existing 
approaches and go beyond them. In the fourth section we develop our theory about the way 
the causal mechanism(s) between political institutions and social capital operate. In the fifth 
section, we illustrate how the theory works with cross-national and other national survey 
data. Finally, we bring our new insights together with suggestions for future research in our 
last section.  
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1. The Generation of Social Capital— The Society-Centered Model 
  
The social capital literature is divided on the question of the causes and origins of social 
capital. On the one side are scholars who argue that variations in the amount and type of 
social capital can be explained primarily by society-centered approaches (Fukuyama 1999; 
Putnam 2000). In this Tocquevillian approach, the capacity of a society to produce social 
capital among its citizens is determined by its long-term experience of social organization, 
anchored in historical and cultural experiences that can be traced back over very long 
periods. . 
 
The society-centered approach see regular social interaction, preferably through membership 
in voluntary associations, as the most important mechanism for the generation of social 
capital; more informal types of social interactions have been included in later work as well. 
Following the Tocquevillian tradition, formal and informal associations are seen as creators 
of social capital because of their socializing effects on democratic and cooperative values and 
norms; associations function as “learning schools for democracy.” However, this approach 
has revealed three problems. The first is that in empirical analyses, voluntary associations do 
not fulfill the role they were believed to play in social capital creation. The second problem is 
the theoretical difficulty in distinguishing various types of social interactions from each 
other. The third issue concerns the problems involved in the search for causes or roots of 
social capital. We briefly summarize these issues in turn.  
 
A number of studies carried out in different democratic countries over the last few years have 
called into question the effect of participation in many voluntary associations directed at 
benevolent purposes on social trust and the willingness to cooperate outside of group-life. It 
is true that people who are “joiners” also generally trust and cooperate with others more, but 
this seems to be an effect of self-selection. People who—for some other reason—score high 
on the social ability to trust and cooperate with others join voluntary associations 
disproportionately. However, activity in such organizations does not add much in these 
desired traits, at least not for adults. Members become purely more trusting of their fellow 
members and they cooperate more for group purposes only (Stolle 2001, Uslaner 2002). Thus 
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the evidence that associational membership of adults creates social capital that can be used in 
the wider society simply does not hold (Delhey and Newton 2003; Claiborn and Martin 2000; 
Herreros 2004, Kuenzi 2004, Uslaner 2002, Wollebæck and Selle 2002, Kim 2005).3 Other 
types of social interactions might do the job, yet a second problem occurs. 
 
The second issue is that even if we accepted the importance of volunteering as a premise for 
the learning of cooperation and trust, not all voluntary associations serve a normatively 
desirable purpose. The problem is that we do not yet have a micro-theory of social capital 
that defines those aspects of volunteering that are important for the creation of civic attitudes. 
Many associations are in fact established to create distrust. Alan Brinkley refers to parochial 
communities that do not reach out but instead manifest and nurture an inward-looking and 
segregating culture (1996). Sheri Berman (1997) has argued that the Nazis in Weimar 
Germany used existing voluntary associations as vehicles for their “Machtübername” in 
1933. Far from such extreme examples, some voluntary associations may use their power, for 
example as producer organizations, to extract resources from society in a way that comes 
close to blackmail, giving undue or disproportional advantages to its members to the 
detriment of the rest of society. Organized interests have not always been known to act in a 
way that increases generalized trust in society. The literature on neo-corporatism and on 
“rent-seeking” emphasizes this aspect of the effects of interest organizations (Lewin 1992; 
Olson 1982). 
 
The problem of good and bad associations is readily admitted in social capital research, and 
promising new analyses distinguish groups according to the degree of contact members have 
with individuals unlike themselves. This distinction has been labeled as bridging (contact 
with many people who are dissimilar) versus bonding (contact with people like oneself) 
social interaction. Bridging interactions are believed to create more desirable outcomes 
(Putnam 2000). In a similar vein, Warren distinguishes between groups oriented toward 
status, group identity, and material goods, as well as those focused on inclusive social, 
public, or identity goods (2001). However, both theoretical accounts are still up for empirical 
                                                 
3 The evidence on the relationship between regional associational density and civic attitudes is also mixed at 
best (van der Meer 2003).  
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testing (Marschall and Stolle 2004). Generally, the struggle to distinguish between ‘the good, 
the bad and the ugly’ in the world of voluntary associatons underlines the lack of theoretical 
parameters that define a micro-theory of social capital. Our conclusion from this research is 
that the use of membership in adult voluntary associations as a measurement of social capital 
should be handled with caution, and that its use as a producer of social capital is in all 
likelihood misplaced. 
 
The third problem has to do with the lack of understanding of the actual transmission of 
social capital across generations. Upon closer inspection, it turns out that the theory as it 
stands is of a somewhat deterministic nature (Tarrow 1996).  The research reveals that the 
level of social capital in a society is determined by very long historical trajectories. For 
example, according to Putnam, the differences in the stock of social capital between the 
North and the South in Italy are traced as far back as to the 12th century (Putnam 1993). Also, 
Fukuyama believes that trust is deeply rooted in culture. According to him, it is the result of 
shared ethical habits that emerge in communities over a very long time (1995). Whether this 
view holds or not, the understanding that the amount of social capital in a society is 
historically determined by various societal structures with roots far back in historical time 
has prevented the search for modern-day solutions that help to stimulate the development of 
social capital.4 Yet in this view, governments, and particularly oppressive regimes, can at 
most damage and destroy the social capital that exists (Fukuyama 1995), as the examples of 
the Norman Kingdom in Southern Italy and of several authoritarian and totalitarian regimes 
in Southern and Eastern Europe or Latin America indicate (cf. Sztompka 1996, 1998). In this 
type of analysis, governments are seen as incapable of facilitating the generation of social 
capital.   
 
 
2. The Institution-Centered Approach 
 
As a response to the society-centered and historically-determined approaches, the institution-
centered accounts of social capital theory claim that for social capital to flourish, it needs to 
                                                 
4 This aspect in itself does not falsify the theory, of course.  
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be embedded in and linked to the political context as well as formal political and legal 
institutions (Berman 1997; Encarnación, 2006; Hall 1999; Levi 1998; Tarrow 1996; Rose-
Ackerman and Kornai 2004; Kumlin and Rothstein 2005). According to this group of 
scholars, social capital does not exist independently of politics or government in the realm of 
civil society. Instead, government policies and political institutions create, channel, and 
influence the amount and type of social capital. The capacity of citizens to develop co-
operative ties and establish social trust is in this account heavily influenced by government 
institutions and policies. This point of view would imply that institutional engineering could 
indeed be used to foster social capital.  
 
In comparison to the society-centered perspective, the institutional model fits more squarely 
with the “new institutionalism” in political science (Thelen 1999). This approach has mainly 
focused on the importance of using institutions as independent variables in various 
theoretical models. So far, the “new institutionalism” and the social capital research agenda 
have been mostly disconnected. For example, in his overview of “the new institutionalism,” 
Guy Peters identifies no less than six different institutional approaches in political science 
and concludes that these six approaches and social capital research are mutually exclusive. 
Summarizing this research, he claims that “the concepts of  ‘social capital’ and ‘civil society’ 
are really ways of saying that without the right set of social values structural manipulation 
and constitution writing will produce little positive results” (p. 88). We take this to be the 
general consensus among scholars in the social capital approach, namely that historically 
established cultural traits take precedence over institutions in explaining variation in social 
capital. However, Peters also refers to the work on democratization by Alfred Stepan and 
Juan Linz, who emphasize the importance of institution building for changing citizens’ 
values in a way that helps stabilize fledgling democracies. Peters’ statement about this line of 
reasoning is as follows:  
 
This approach argues, although perhaps not so boldly, that if effective institutions can be 
constructed and managed then in time (and perhaps not very much time), the appropriate 
values will also be created (Peters 1999, p. 88). 
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This argument by Linz and Stepan has been confirmed earlier in studies of German post-war 
development as well. Despite concerns expressed in the original civic culture study (Almond 
and Verba 1963), Baker et al (1981) and Conradt (1984) have shown that the political 
institutions of the Bundesrepublik have created a democratic political culture in Germany.  
 
We can distinguish two main types of institutional arguments in relation to the concept of 
social capital: an attitudinal approach and an institutional-structural approach. In the former, 
scholars examine the relationship between institutional/political trust and generalized trust. 
For example, Hall indicates that political trust and generalized trust are correlated in Britain 
(Hall, 1999). Kaase discusses the consistently positive but weak correlation between the two 
types of trust in cross-national survey samples (Kaase, 1999: 14).  
 
However, interpretations of this correlation vary. Some recognize the correlation between the 
two types of trust, but see generalized trust mostly as a predictor of political trust. For 
example, Lipset and Schneider claim that in the United States, what they call the “personal 
characteristic of trust in others” might explain developments in public confidence. “A general 
feeling of confidence in institutions seems to derive from a personal outlook of optimism, 
satisfaction and trust” (1983: 120ff.). Newton and Norris elaborate this causal flow when 
they find a strong positive correlation at the aggregate level in the analysis of the World 
Value Surveys in seventeen trilateral democracies. They interpret their findings as evidence 
that social capital “can help build effective social and political institutions, which can help 
governments perform effectively, and this in turn encourages confidence in civic institutions” 
(2000). This, of course, is the logic of Putnam’s argument, in which he shows that regional 
governmental performance depends on levels of regional social capital (1993). The problem 
with all of these analyses is that the flow of causality is not clear. Brehm and Rahn, for 
example, have tried to disentangle the causality between these two types of trust with a 
statistical analysis of the General Social Surveys (GSS) data and a model that allows for 
reciprocal causation. They found that confidence in institutions has a larger effect on 
interpersonal trust than the other way around, even though they see both types of trust as 
influencing each other (Brehm and Rahn, 1997: 1014ff.).  
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We see three main problems with the attitudinal arguments regarding the relationship 
between institutions and social capital. First, the fact that attitudes cause other attitudes is not 
very illuminating. The main problem of the attitudinal approach is that attitudes that relate to 
institutions are not connected to the actual institutional characteristics. Second, there are a 
variety of forms of institutional trust that we can identify in the study of advanced 
industrialized democracies, but it is often a problem that most of them are collapsed under 
one label. It is no wonder, then, that scholars find weak or no correlations between 
generalized trust and other forms of institutional trust or confidence, since they focus on 
confidence in political institutions in general without specifying how the relationship 
between the specific institutional characteristics and generalized trust work. The third 
problem is that the causal mechanism for both causal claims remains unclear. Given 
Putnam’s (1993) logic from trust to institutional performance to confidence in politicians, we 
do not know how trusting people create better service performance and better local 
politicians who are more responsive. Do more trusting citizens contact governmental officials 
more frequently to pressure them into good performance? Or is it that local politicians just 
reflect the culture of trust or distrust that prevails in their local societies?  How exactly can 
the trust or distrust of citizens and their ability to reciprocate influence governmental 
performance and, as a result, stimulate their confidence in politicians? We argue that the 
reverse logic is just as plausible. Theorizing the causal mechanism on how the link between 
institutional characteristics and attitudinal social capital works might be a good first step in 
the right direction. In sum, what is missing in the literature that advocates social capital as the 
prerequisite for good institutional performance and democracy is a theoretical specification 
of how the mechanism(s) that accounts for the causal logic operate(s). 
 
The second institutional approach overcomes some of these problems. This approach 
generally centers on the role of the state as a source of social capital generation. Tarrow, for 
example, maintains that the “state plays a fundamental role in shaping civic capacity” 
(Tarrow, 1996:395). It has been argued that governments can realize their capacity to 
generate trust only if citizens consider the state itself to be trustworthy (Levi, 1998: 86). 
States, for example, enable the establishment of contracts in that they provide information 
and monitor legislation, and enforce rights and rules that sanction lawbreakers, protect 
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minorities and actively support the integration and participation of citizens (Levi, 1998: 
85ff.). This discussion is very insightful, as it specifies institutional characteristics such as the 
efficiency and trustworthiness of state institutions as influential for social capital creation. 
Certain types of institutions, such as those that deal with lawbreakers, are also emphasized. 
Yet what is still missing here is a specification of how the causal mechanism between 
institutional arrangements and trustworthy behavior works.     
 
To sum up, our review of the existing approaches to the sources of social capital has revealed 
three points. Firstly, the society-centered approaches are theoretically under-specified and 
lack successful empirical testing. Secondly, so far the institutional arguments have not 
specified which type of institutions are important and how they work in the creation (or 
destruction) of generalized trust. Our intention is to outline a model that indicates a) which 
political institutions are the most important for generating social capital and b) how to 
understand the causal mechanism between these institutions’ characteristics and social trust. 
The third point is that we need to know which political institutions may be important for 
generating social capital. The reason is simple.  The number of political institutions in any 
political system, democratic or not, is huge; moreover, the ways in which these can be 
combined into different institutional systems is infinite. This implies that we need to specify 
if it is the electoral, or the judicial, or the military, or the administrative or any other political 
institutions that may be particularly important for generating social capital.  
 
 
3) The Role of Political Institutions—But Which Ones?  
 
As stated above, the problem is that many forms of institutional trust and confidence are 
collapsed under one label as “trust in government.” Our point is that the literature has not 
distinguished between confidence in the institutions on the representational side of the 
political system (parties, parliaments, cabinets, etc.) and confidence in the institutions on the 
implementation side of the political system.  The theoretical reason for why the confidence 
that people place in these two types of political institutions differ is the following.  On the 
representational side, one of the main roles for political institutions is to be partisan. A 
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political party that holds government power, or the majority in a Parliament, is supposed to 
try to implement its ideology in a partisan way. Thus, people that support the ideology of the 
ruling party (or parties) are likely to have confidence in them, while citizens that oppose their 
ideology are likely to report a lack of confidence. However, it is less likely that this type of 
political trust or distrust that is connected to political leanings should influence one’s 
generalized trust in other people. There is to our knowledge no plausible causal mechanism 
linking these two phenomena.  This is why we usually find a strong correlation between 
political leanings and political trust but a weak correlation between confidence in these types 
of political institutions and social trust (for the original argument see Citrin 1974 and also 
Newton 1999a; Newton and Norris 2000). We believe that the weak findings of causal 
relationships between generalized trust and “trust in government” are mostly due to this 
failure to distinguish between what is the cause of trust in various kinds of political 
institutions. 
 
We propose that the major source of variations in generalized trust is to be found at the other 
side of the state machinery, namely the legal and administrative branches of the state such as 
the police, the courts, and other government organizations responsible for implementing 
public policies. We argue that these branches of government need to be distinguished from 
the influence of representational institutions such as the legislative and the executive for 
three main reasons. The main reason is that while the base for trusting (or distrusting) the 
institutions dominated by politicians is partisanship, the reason for trusting civil servants, 
judges, the police, or social service institutions are their even-handedness and/or impartiality 
(Rothstein & Teorell 2005).Our argument is that these implementing political institutions 
reveal messages about the principles and norms of the prevailing political culture that mold 
and shape people’s beliefs and values.  
 
This argument about the role of procedural fairness enjoys strong empirical support in 
research conducted by psychologist Tom Tyler on why people accept the principle of 
compliance with the law.  When citizens had reasons to believe that the procedures applied 
by officials in the implementation of laws were fair; they were most acceptant of the legal 
decisions. Procedural fairness was a more important factor than the risk of being caught and 
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punished or the general moral norm that people should obey democratically passed laws, and 
even trumped an individual’s belief that the outcome of the case has been in his or her favor 
or not (Tyler 1992, 1998).  
 
Compared to other political institutions, the police and the other legal institutions of the state 
have a special task, namely to detect and punish people who, in game theory parlance, use 
opportunistic strategy (we would prefer the term treacherous). In other words, the judicial 
system and the police are in the business of taking care of “other people” who are 
untrustworthy.. We therefore want to emphasize here the role of the judicial institutions and 
the police in particular (what we call “order institutions”). In sum, we argue that the 
impartiality and fairness of street-level political institutions are important dimensions of 
institutional trust and confidence that can be conceptually separated from conventional 
political trust in politicians, parties, and “the government”. In the following section we 
elaborate exactly how these institutions influence generalized trust.  
 
 
4. Institutions, corruption and social capital – the causal mechanism 
How then would corrupt and partisan practices in the administrative machinery of the state 
influence people’s propensity to trust others in their society? The link between corruption 
and social capital is by no means obvious since there are (at least) two possible answers to 
this issue. The first would be the assumption that in societies where people cannot trust the 
police or the judicial system, they would compensate for this lack of trust by increasing their 
social networking and their trust in each other. Conversely, an inefficient, corrupt, biased and 
unfair administrative system does not allow any kind of trust to rise, and particularly prevents 
the development of trust between people. We examine both arguments in turn.   
 
As for the first line of reasoning, the logic is that, facing a non-functioning state apparatus, 
society gets together to overcome the problems of the state. In other words, people would 
compensate for their lack of trust in political institutions by increasing their connectedness to 
other people whom they can trust. In this way, society is “forced” to cooperate in order to 
circumvent or fill the gaps in the inefficient, biased or disorganized state. In this vein, 
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Michael Woolcook writes that “rampant corruption, frustrating bureaucratic delays, 
suppressed civil liberties, failure to safeguard property rights and uphold the rule of law, 
forces communities back on themselves, demanding that they supply privately and informally 
what should be delivered publicly and formally”  (Woolcook 2001, p. 16).  Similar views 
have been expressed about the state of civil society in the analysis of authoritarian and 
totalitarian states. It has been shown that people under communism have created cooperative 
networks in order to alleviate the lack of opportunities and material support provided by their 
government (Sztompka 1996; Völker and Flap 2001).  
 
One of the leading scholars of corruption makes a related argument about the positive 
correlation between corruption and social capital. Della Porta’s claim is that in order to make 
corrupt exchanges, one has to trust the others who are involved in corruption. While this is 
“bad” social capital, the idea is that corruption creates strong norms of reciprocity and trust 
between those who are involved in corruption.  
 
In all illegal systems of exchange, a high degree of trust and reciprocity is necessary 
among participants, so the internalization of some rules of the game is therefore 
necessary. A good reputation for respecting the terms of the illegal exchange, which 
participants often call ‘honesty’, is valued by the actors involved.  (Della Porta 2000, 
p. 223).   
 
It has been acknowledged in these debates that these types of ad-hoc cooperation and niches 
of social interactions are not of a generalized character. Surely trust can thrive in such 
particularized communities, but this type of trust cannot reach out to include various groups 
of the population. The small dense niche networks in East Germany characterized by high 
levels of in-group trust were so special because they actually were created as a protection 
against weak ties and other types of networks (Völker and Flap 2001). The high degree of 
norm conformity that Della Porta depicts among those who involve in corruption may be 
plausible. But again, this is a specific type of trust in that the “secret” of corruption cannot be 
revealed to the outsider—it thus does not reflect generalized trust, which is the aspect of 
social capital that is at stake in the theory of social capital. In fact with the existence of such 
 13
small-knit closed networks, information will not flow and generalized trust will not spread at 
all (Granovetter 1973; Uslaner 2002).  
 
Moreover, people involved in corruption need not really trust one another, because they are 
in a situation of “mutual deterrence”. By this we mean that both parties stand to lose if the 
corrupt exchange is revealed, as giving and taking bribes are both criminal offences in most 
political systems. Deterrence is not exactly the same as the trust that the other does not 
defect. Based on very interesting empirical evidence, Varese argues that the internal 
operations of criminal organizations such as the Mafia are not at all based on trust, but rather 
on fear, suspicion and deep mistrust (Varese 2004). 
 
When it comes to attitudes of a generalized nature, such as generalized trust, our argument is 
that things work the other way around. A deteriorating, biased, corrupt administrative system 
generally goes hand in hand with low levels of social capital, particularly when measured as 
generalized trust. The institutional theory of trust that we propose builds on Levi’s insight 
that an individual’s perceptions of fair, just, and effective political institutions and the fact 
that most fellow citizens have similar beliefs all influence the individual’s generalized trust. 
Government institutions generate social trust only if citizens consider the political institutions 
to be trustworthy. In this respect it is important, according to Levi, that states enable the 
establishment of contracts by providing information and monitor laws, enforcing rights and 
rules that sanction lawbreakers, and protecting minorities (Levi 1998, p. 85ff).  
 
The argument runs as follows. Institutions of law and order have one particularly important 
task: to detect and punish people who are “traitors”, that is, those who break contracts, offer 
or take bribes, engage in clientelistic operations, cheat, steal, murder and do other such non-
cooperative things and therefore should not be trusted. Thus, if citizens think that these 
institutions do what they are supposed to do in a fair and effective manner then they also have 
reason to believe that the chance of people getting away with such treacherous behavior is 
small. If so, citizens believe that people have good reason to refrain from acting in a 
treacherous manner and because of this, they will believe that “most people can be trusted” in 
their society. However, we wish to emphasize that it is not just the efficiency with which 
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treacherous behavior is punished that matters for generalized trust, but the combination of 
efficiency and fairness of order institutions.5 Fairness of public institutions such as the 
police, courts or even social service offices are particularly relevant to attitudes about other 
people because they resemble the street-level bureaucracy and connect institutions and 
people with each other. Police officers, social service bureaucrats, judges etc. are both 
representatives of the people as well as exhibitors of institutional values. In sum, if citizens 
can trust the institutional effectiveness and fairness of the judicial system and the police, then 
one’s generalized trust in others can be facilitated.  
 
There is also a positive twist to our argument. There is ample evidence that citizens’ 
evaluation of the performance of the different types of government institutions with which 
they interact influences their confidence in them (Kumlin 2004). Moreover, it can be 
demonstrated that contact with more universal types of welfare institutions—as opposed to 
selective and means-tested (and therefore biased) institutions—is positively related to 
generalized trust (Rothstein and Stolle 2003). We would like to expand the argument here to 
include the impartial and unbiased character of various types of institutions with which 
citizens are in contact, including the courts and police, and their positive facilitative influence 
on generalized trust. Below we specify the deductive logic as composed of the following four 
causal mechanisms.  
                  
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
As indicated in Figure 1, we argue that the absence or presence of corruption, the level of 
arbitrariness and bias of public officials in the police and court systems have two important 
consequences that become influential for citizens in several ways: they influence the trust in 
the institutional effectiveness and trust in institutional fairness. Surely, corruption does not go 
hand in hand with trust in governmental institutions. It is obvious that the reason for offering 
bribes is that one does not trust public officials to do what they otherwise are supposed to do. 
                                                 
5 Efficiency of institutions alone can lead to feelings of relative safety or protection from arbitrary crime 
committed by fellow citizens, as the low crime rates in former Communist countries of Eastern Europe indicate; 
however, they cannot create generalized trust because of their lack of fairness and impartiality.  
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We develop four different parts of this causal mechanism between institutional 
characteristics and generalized trust. Institutional efficiency and fairness: 
1. influence the individual agent’s perception of his/her safety and security. The absence or 
presence of fear of others will obviously influence the belief that “most other people” ought/ 
or ought not to be trusted. 
2. determine the individual agent’s inference from those who are given the responsibility of 
guarding the public interest to the ret of society. For example, if those in position of 
responsibility cannot be trusted, then “most other people” can surely not be trusted.  
3. shape the observance of the behavior of fellow citizens, as institutional fairness sets the 
tone.  The message of corrupt systems is, for example, that in order to get what one needs in 
life, one must be engaged in various forms of corruption. Hence, the individual agent will 
witness the use of corruption amongst fellow citizens, and will feel obliged to engage in 
corrupt practices in order to get what she deems necessary in life. However, there cannot be 
any generalized trust in those individuals who just take advantage of others and the system.  
4. cause experiences with these institutions when in direct contact with them. Corrupt and 
unfair institutions, for example, might lead to experiences of discrimination and injustice, 
which negatively influences generalized trust.  
 
Our model helps to identify some of the important dimensions of state institutions that are 
closely related to a significant aspect of social capital, namely generalized trust, and we thus 
present an institutional theory of generalized trust.6 To reiterate, we consider these 
institutions to be important influences on citizens’ views of other people because they 1) are 
permanent institutions that offer direct contact with street-level bureaucrats in every-day 
settings, 2) exhibit important norms of society such as impartiality and fairness, and 3) deal 
with a valuable public good, personal safety.  
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Our argument is certainly not that all forms of “generalized trust” are caused by experiences with and trust in 
the impartiality and fairness of certain government institutions. There are other important sources that create 
such social capital, for example the early childhood experiences of trust relationships in one’s immediate family 
(Uslaner 2002). However, we would like to suggest that early childhood influences on trust might be the result 
of parents’ experiences with street-level order institutions as presented above.  
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5. Empirical Illustrations 
 
We will illustrate our theory by using a variety of data sources. First, we explore whether our 
general argument about varieties of institutional confidence and trust holds, and whether 
certain types of institutions such as the legal system, the police and social welfare institutions 
play a more important role for generalized trust than the political/representational 
institutions. In the second part, we use the longitudinal character of the World Value Survey 
and estimate how the changes in attitudes about institutions relate to the changes in 
generalized trust in various societies. In the third part, we go a step further and move beyond 
this attitudinal approach to include measurements of the institutions themselves. This 
empirical illustration of our theory requires the merging of aggregate statistical institutional 
measurements with aggregate public opinion data. Fourth, an essential contribution of our 
work is that we do not just show how the causal mechanism specified captures the way 
institutions might influence aggregate attitudes, but we add tests at the micro-level as well. 
Are individuals who have experienced corruption, unfair institutions, discrimination, or lack 
of protection, less trusting as well?  
 
5.1. Data 
 
 For the various steps we utilize a longitudinal cross-national sample provided by the World 
Values Survey, as well as data from several national country surveys such as Sweden and 
Canada. Our cross-national survey data is merged with aggregate statistical data at the 
country level. Our data sources include: 
? The various waves of the World Values Surveys (1980/1990/1995-97)7.  
? The pooled data from the Swedish survey conducted by the SOM (Society – 
Opinion – Media) institute at Göteborg University, Sweden.8 
                                                 
7. For a full description of the data set, see www.worldvaluessurvey.org.  
8 The institute is managed jointly by the Departments of Political Science, Public Administration and 
Journalism/Mass Communication at Göteborg University. For this project, questions about trust have been 
added to the five surveys 1996 to 2000 with funding from the Swedish Council for Research in the Humanities 
and Social Sciences. For information about sampling, response rates, etc. please visit www.som.gu.se or contact 
som@jmg.gu.se. 
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? The national sample of the Equality, Security and Community (ESC) survey of 
Canada, which was completed at the Institute for Social Research (ISR) York 
University in 1999/2000.9  
 
5.2 Varieties of Institutional Trust—A General Exploration 
Our previous discussion demonstrated that there are at least two dimensions along which 
citizens might judge political institutions: they expect representatives of political, legal, and 
social institutions to function as their agents; at the same time, citizens focus on neutrality, 
fairness, and impartiality. Moreover, we argued that citizens expect more agency and more 
political bias from political institutions with elected offices, whereas they expect impartiality 
and an unbiased approach from order institutions. Our claim is, of course, that the lack of 
impartiality of order institutions damages generalized trust; alternatively, institution’s 
perceived impartiality should support generalized trust. Before we turn to such causal links, 
we examine the distinctions that citizens draw between various institutions.  Can we actually 
find the difference between trust in political institutions that are perhaps seen as partisan, and 
trust in order institutions for which citizens should demand more fairness and impartiality?  
 
            [Table 1 about here] 
 
In order to see whether trust in various political institutions actually does fall onto different 
dimensions, we subject the individual level third wave of the World Values Survey to a 
factor analysis.10 As the results in Table 1 indicate, citizens from 56 countries make 
distinctions between types of confidence in institutions in a list of nine different types. The 
factor analysis (principal component, with varimax rotation) reveals that three different 
dimensions of institutions emerge.11 Indeed most political institutions with elected offices 
fall under the first dimension, such as confidence for parliaments, governments, political 
parties, and—to our surprise—the civil service. In many countries, it may be that the high-
                                                 
9 The survey component of the ESC project (see http://www.arts.ubc.ca/cresp/outc.htm) is designed to provide 
information on social networks, well-being, socio-economic status, civic participation, and attitudes toward 
government policies. 
10 The third wave WVS contains the most complete battery of questions about confidence in a variety of 
institutions.  
11 The results are confirmed in the WVS aggregate data set.  
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level civil service is seen as partisan and as an extension of elected governmental offices, and 
indeed in various countries high-level civil servants are often politicized (Halligan 2003). 
The second dimension reflects the group of order institutions that are expected to function 
with less political bias and in an impartial manner, even though the actual experiences in 
authoritarian systems, for example, are sometimes very different. Under this dimension fall 
trust in the army, legal institutions and the police. A third dimension taps confidence in 
institutions that are mostly control institutions that check the power of institutions with 
elected offices, and include the media (see Table 1). In other words, citizens do make 
distinctions between government institutions in the way our theory predicts, particularly as 
political institutions are distinguished from those that help to keep law and order.   
 
                                                     [Table 2 about here] 
 
A cross-check with survey results from Sweden should verify our analysis. The Swedish 
SOM data include a variety of questions on trust in political institutions,12 ranging from 
institutions of the welfare state such as schools and the health system to political institutions 
such as parliament and the government. Using the yearly SOM surveys from 1996 to 2003 
we reach a similar result: citizens in Sweden make parallel distinctions between different 
types of trust in institutions in a list of ten. The factor analysis (principal component, with 
varimax rotation) reveals that three different dimensions of institutions emerge. Again, most 
political institutions with elected offices fall onto the first dimension, which includes 
confidence in parliaments, governments, and local governments. The second dimension again 
reflects the group of institutions that are of a more permanent character and less political in 
nature; they include the public health system, the public school system, the police, legal 
institutions, and defense. Here, typical order institutions and those of the welfare state come 
together on one dimension as predicted by our theoretical framework. The third dimension 
taps trust in control institutions that check power of institutions with elected offices, and 
includes the media. This result nicely confirms the WVS data. The question now is whether 
these different types of institutional confidence also reveal differences in their relationship to 
generalized trust. We will go beyond the attitudinal approach and analyze whether the 
                                                 
12 The survey questions here were phrased with regard to trust in institutions (as opposed to confidence).  
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institutional characteristics of fairness and impartiality versus corruption explain levels of 
generalized trust in the section that follows this analysis.  
 
 
5.3 Perceptions of Institutions and Generalized Trust—the Attitudinal 
Approach 
 
Even more interesting in the light of our argument is the relationship between the dimensions 
of institutional confidence and generalized trust. In the large cross-national sample of the 
WVS, the correlation between confidence in political/ biased institutions, as well as between 
confidence in power-checking institutions and generalized trust is negative and low (see 
Figure 2a for evidence of the former). As predicted by our theory, there is no relationship 
between political institutions with elected office and generalized trust at the aggregate level. 
Trust in solely political institutions with elected office is mostly determined by party 
preference and political ideology (Citrin 1974). At the individual level, this kind of trust 
should fluctuate much more over time, depending on who is in power. However, in line with 
our expectations, we find a rather strong relationship between aggregate levels of confidence 
in order institutions and generalized trust. The results support the claim that societies in 
which the impartiality of the order institutions cannot be guaranteed, as expressed by lower 
citizens’ confidence in these types of institutions, also show lower levels of generalized trust 
(and vice versa), see Figure 2b. 
               
   [Figure 2a and 2b about here] 
 
Surely the development of our causal mechanism ensures a causal logic that underlies our 
empirical analysis, yet if institutions are in any way responsible for social capital in the form 
of generalized trust, then we ought to see a connection longitudinally as well. In other words, 
if institutions become more biased or less impartial over time, we would expect a negative 
effect on generalized trust. Similarly, if institutions become fair and impartial in a given 
country we would expect a positive effect. At the same time, we might expect asymmetric 
effects, as a loss in impartiality might be more devastating to generalized trust than a gain is 
to its development. This expectation is also influenced by the theoretical literature on 
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generalized trust, which predicts that a loss in trust is very hard to repair (Offe 1999). 
According to our theoretical discussion and these insights, we would expect strong negative 
consequences for generalized trust when trust in order institutions has declined in countries 
over time.    
                                                      [Figure 3 about here] 
 
For Figure 3, we compiled data from countries that participated in the first and last waves of 
the World Value survey. Since the first wave was taken in 1981 and the last one more 
recently in the year 2000, we believe that this 19 year period represents a good time frame for 
examining the relationship between longitudinal changes in institutional trust and generalized 
trust. More precisely, we will analyze whether changes in trust in the police are related to 
generalized trust.13 Unfortunately, only 20 countries have data in both waves; very few 
countries experienced a slip in police trust, most visibly Britain, Northern Ireland, South 
Korea, and Japan. Two of these countries, Britain and South Korea, also experienced a rather 
strong decline in generalized trust. Overall, the changes in police trust and changes in 
generalized trust over this period of about 20 years are somewhat related. Generally, 
countries with a loss of 10 percentage points in confidence in the police in this period had on 
average a 6 percentage point loss in generalized trust. A positive or stable trend did not lead 
to significant positive changes in generalized trust. This result suggests that negative 
institutional trends relate to generalized trust, whereas it is not certain whether positive trends 
have an equally positive relationship. The overall correlation of changes in police trust and 
changes in generalized trust is .27 for the sample of 20 countries.  
 
Since we have established that citizens distinguish between various types of institutional 
trust, and that at the aggregate level generalized trust is more closely related to trust in order 
institutions as compared to institutions with elected offices, our next task is to analyze which 
institutional experiences relate to generalized trust. Our theory about the causal mechanism 
entails that important aspects of confidence in order institutions are institutional efficiency in 
terms or protection and safety as well as institutional impartiality and fairness. Particularly, 
we emphasized four causal linkages from institutional experiences to generalized trust, 
                                                 
13 Trust in legal institutions was not chosen because this item was not asked in wave 4.  
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namely citizens’ feelings of safety and protection, citizens’ inference from elites’ and fellow 
citizens’ behavior, as well as their experiences with discrimination. If these are correct, we 
should see that citizens are less able to trust when they experience widespread corruption, 
inefficient institutions, unreliable police and arbitrariness and bias of courts. We will analyze 
some of these propositions at the macro and micro-levels below.  
 
5.4 Institutional Characteristics and Generalized Trust—Macro Results  
The question, then, is whether not only perceptions of order institutions but also actual 
“objective” variances in their characteristics are related to the spread of generalized trust 
across countries. For this part of our analysis, we utilize the aggregate data of the World 
Value survey, for which we collapse the second and third wave into a cross-sectional data 
set. For the multivariate analysis, we identify two important institutional dimensions, which 
according to our theory should matter most for social capital: institutional effectiveness and 
institutional impartiality. We have chosen the “Government Effectiveness” point estimate 
indicator for 1996 used by the World Bank’s research unit (Kaufmann, Kraay, Mastruzzi 
2003) as our measure of institutional effectiveness. It measures the competence of civil 
servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of 
the government’s commitment to policies. The main focus of this index is on “inputs” 
required for the government to be able to produce and implement good policies and deliver 
public goods. The impartiality measure is complementary and delves into the level of bias in 
important institutions. It is a summated rating index of three measures from the IRIS14 data 
that tap the impartiality of courts and the bureaucracy as well as the corruption in politics 
generally (Knack and Keefer 1998).15 In addition to our measures of institutional efficiency 
and impartiality we also include the common measure of longevity of democracy (Inglehart 
1999) as a measure of overall institutional impartiality over time. The guarantee of politically 
democratic institutions over time should imply more impartial rule of law and fairer police 
practices compared to authoritarian regimes, although there is of course a strong variance 
between democracies as to the level of impartiality of their institutions. Furthermore, we 
                                                 
14 IRIS stands for International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Data which provides annual values for indicators of 
the quality of governance, 1982-1997, constructed by Stephen Knack and the IRIS Center, University of 
Maryland, from monthly ICRG data provided by The PRS Group.  
15 These are not ideal measures of institutional impartiality, yet indicators of police corruption or court 
corruption are not readily available 
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include a measure of equality of outcomes, the GINI index. More egalitarian societies 
without major societal socio-economic gaps are believed to achieve higher levels of 
generalized trust than societies in which inequality is rampant (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005).  
 
In our multivariate model, we also include control variables that are related to generalized 
trust at the country level. Basic patterns of religion (Inglehart 1999), ethnic and religious 
fractionalization Alesina and La Ferrara 2000), the experience of communism (Howard 
2003), as well as classic network indicators of social capital such as aggregated memberships 
in voluntary associations (Putnam 1993) should all matter for generalized trust. For example, 
Protestant countries, countries with a high GDP per capita and high educational secondary 
enrollment rates, as well as those with fewer ethnic and religious divisions should be better 
able to develop interpersonal citizen trust than other countries. Of course, also GDP per 
capita (Inglehart 1999) and educational enrollment (Brehm and Rahn 1997) play a role, yet 
we do not include those factors in the baseline model as they are highly correlated with our 
institutional variables and other controls. We should see that institutional impartiality and 
effectiveness matter for generalized trust holding other factors that explain variances in trust 
constant.16  
                [Table 3 about here]  
 
In Table 3 we present at first bivariate results of our main indicators and generalized trust. 
The table reveals that most variables perform according to the expectations. Non-protestant 
countries, and those with high levels of ethnic fractionalization (not so much religious 
fractionalization), former communist countries, and those with low GDP per capita and low 
school enrolments all have lower levels of generalized trust. Institutions matter as well: 
institutional efficiency, impartiality, equality of outcomes measured by low GINI scores, as 
well as democratic longevity are all positively linked with aggregate trust.  
 
                  [Table 4 about here]  
 
                                                 
16 See descriptive statistics in the appendix.  
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In our multivariate model, we use the Protestant culture and ethnic and religious diversity, 
communist background as well as membership in voluntary associations as the most 
important cultural control variables, yet we do not utilize the other factors in the baseline 
model, as all institutional variables are related to the longevity of democracy, GDP per 
capita, educational enrolment, and these variables are also related to each other. Because of 
multicollinearity therefore, the institutional variables are examined individually in addition to 
the baseline model.17  GDP per capita and secondary school enrolment did not withstand the 
multivariate test and lost statistical significance in a multivariate model. As Table 4 indicates, 
all institutional variables are significantly related to generalized trust, even when controlling 
for important societal characteristics and historical experiences. Countries with high levels of 
generalized trust also have the most effective and impartial institutions, and the longest 
experiences with democracy, as well as most egalitarian socio-economic outcomes, 
controlled for important societal attributes.  
 
Moreover, our theory implies that when institutional effectiveness and impartiality come 
together, we should see particularly strong effects on trust. We therefore collapsed the 
measurement of institutional efficiency and impartiality into one index and used an 
interaction model as well. Countries with institutions, which are efficient as well as impartial 
at the same time, have significantly more trust than other countries. The interaction effect 
accounts for 3.2% of the variance in generalized trust.18 In a second interaction model we 
compared countries with highly efficient institutions to all others and multiplied this score 
with the impartiality measure.  Both models indicate that the effect of high institutional 
impartiality conditional upon high effectiveness is particularly strong. In order to fully 
examine the relationship between institutional characteristics and experiences as well as 
generalized trust, we need to analyze this connection in a multivariate micro model as well.   
 
 
 
                                                 
17 See Delhey and Newton (2005) and Freitag (2006) for a similar approach.  
18 This was calculated by comparing the R-squared of a regression model with institutional efficiency and 
impartiality measures and a model with these variables and the interaction term, on this procedure see Jaccard 
(2003).  
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5.5. Linkages at the Micro Level 
 
Do individual experiences with institutions also translate into specific patterns of generalized 
trust, as our theory would predict? To get closer to the way our causal mechanism operates at 
the micro level, we analyze whether trust in order institutions influences generalized trust in 
a multivariate setting. If trust in order institutions remains an important factor in relation to 
generalized trust, even when controlling for other variables, we would be yet another step 
closer to assembling the evidence for how the theory works at the micro level. We present 
results for tests in three different data sets: the Swedish SOM surveys, the ESC Canadian 
national survey as well as in the second and third waves of the World Value surveys.19  
    
[Table 5 about here] 
 
Table 5 shows three similar models in three different data sets in which we analyze the 
micro-relationship between institutional experiences and generalized trust. As in our macro 
models, here too we include various other micro level predictors that have been shown to be 
important for generalized trust, such as socio-economic resources, attitudes such as life 
satisfaction, and, of course, trust in order institutions. Of course, variables that have been put 
forth by other theoretical approaches are also included, such as associational membership and 
trust in political institutions (or trust in government). Many socio-economic resources emerge 
as important factors for trust; education is predominant but individual associational 
membership and attitudes such as life satisfaction are also significant. Model 1 includes trust 
in order institutions which—when controlling for all these other variables—emerges as a 
very strong factor: a one unit increase in trust in order institutions (a 4 point scale) 
corresponds to a .4 increase in generalized trust on an 11-point scale.20 The fact that trust in 
order institutions holds in a model in which trust in political institutions and associational 
membership is controlled strengthens the idea that order institutions are not unimportant for 
generalized trust.  
                                                 
19 Descriptive statistics are in the appendix.  
20 This effect is difficult to compare to associational involvement because of their different scales, e.g. being an 
associational member as compared to not being a member pushes .84 on the 11-point generalized trust scale.  
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In the Canadian data, we do not have the same indicators of trust in order institutions, 
however a ranking of some political institutions exists. According to our theory, we should 
find that the ranking of courts and the police as political institutions from which citizens 
expect impartiality and effectiveness should be highly correlated with values of generalized 
trust. We do indeed find the relationship between selected institutional ratings and 
generalized trust. Those citizens who rate courts highly are also those who trust other 
citizens, controlling for a variety of factors including a ranking of the government. More 
specifically, each additional point on the 0-100 court rating scale increases the odds of 
generalized trust by about 10%, controlling for other variables in the model. The courts take 
here a more important role than the police and the government, although also those are 
positively related to trust. 21 Second, we also find that Quebeckers are generally less trusting 
than other Canadians (Soroka et al forthcoming). It is common for minority social and ethnic 
groups to experience collective discrimination from a variety of political institutions, which 
translates into perceived unfairness or bias, and as we argue, the lack of perceived 
impartiality may translate into lasting feelings of distrust towards the wider society. African-
Americans in the United States, immigrants in various democratic systems as well as ethnic 
minorities do not perceive that the system works for them (Alesina and La Ferrara 2000; 
Orlando 2000, Putnam 2003). Soroka et al found that immigrants in Canada do not have a 
favorable view of the police (forthcoming). Overall, holding other variables constant, 
generalized trust is positively related to education, age, employment, associational 
membership, whereas people in larger metropolitan areas are less trusting in Canada, holding 
other variables constant. Most importantly, institutional evaluations of the courts shape how 
citizens view other people. 
  
Finally, this individual-level relationship is confirmed in the World Value survey as well. We 
are using here a summated rating scale of trust in order institutions including trust in the 
police, trust in legal institutions as well as trust in the army.22 Stata’s svylogit is utilized here 
in order to control for the nested structure of the cross-national data set. Controlling for 
                                                 
21 The one point increase on the 0-100 scale for police rating increases the odds of trust by 6%, and for the rating 
if government scale by 5%.  
22 Since all three items were included in the second and third wave of the WVS, we utilize both of them here as 
a cross-sectional data set. The Cronbach’s alpha using these three items is alpha=.66.  
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socio-economic resources, associational membership, life satisfaction, size of the 
community, we again find that trust in order institutions significantly relates to generalized 
trust. With regard to the comparison to trust in political institutions though, the results are 
perhaps least convincing in the World Values survey: moving from no trust to trust on the 
scale for order institutions yields an increase of the odds of generalized trust by about 48%, 
controlling for other variables in the model; whereas the same unit increase on the political 
trust scale increases the odds of generalized trust by 99%. Nevertheless, the importance of 
trust in order institutions for generalized trust holds up vis-à-vis other control variables.  
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Our argument is that the structure and characteristics of contemporary government 
institutions is an important and overlooked factor that matters for the generation of 
generalized trust. The theory we have presented gives an explanation for how the causal flow 
from impartial institutions to generalized trust might operate. The procedural fairness of 
these institutions influences citizens’ institutional trust and, more specifically, (1) how they 
experience feelings of safety and protection; (2) how citizens make inferences from the 
system and public officials to other citizens, (3) how citizens observe the behavior of fellow 
citizens, and (4) how they experience discrimination against themselves or those close to 
them.  
 
In our empirical section we have found support that these causal mechanisms are at work. 
What is special about our empirical analysis is that it works both at the micro and the macro 
levels. Citizens seem to make distinctions between various types of institutions, and trust in 
order institutions and in other institutions that implement policy is according to our findings 
more important for generalized trust than other types of institutional confidence, in most of 
our models. A key point of our discussion is the direction of causality. How do we know that 
institutions actually shape social capital and not the other way around? Clearly, many more 
tests and analyses have to be preformed in order to ensure that this direction of causality 
holds. For example, an ideal test ground would be quasi-experimental case studies of 
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institutional reform with pre/ and post- measurements of social capital. However, the first 
step in this discussion must surely be the development of a causal mechanism based on a 
strong theoretical account. Our empirical analyses can only be first illustrations of these 
theoretical insights. Taken alone, each of our results are not enough to make our point. Yet 
the causal mechanism we have developed and the multiplicity of results we presented 
throughout this article reveal a great deal about how civic attitudes such as trust are related to 
and most likely embedded in impartial, fair, and efficient institutions.  
 
Finally, we believe that important policy implications may follow from our results. If the 
society-centered model is correct, governments can claim that the main problems that plague 
their societies are caused by too little volunteering. To make democracy work and the 
economy grow, citizens have to “get involved”. However, if our theory is correct, 
governments cannot put the blame on their citizens for the lack of social capital. Instead, the 
policy message becomes a very different one, namely that the lack of social capital is caused 
by dysfunctional government institutions.  
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Table 1  
Confidence in Various Institutions 
(WVS Wave 3, Number of countries=56,  
Number of included respondents: 64,997)  
 Factor 1: 
Political/ 
Biased 
Institutions 
Factor 2: 
Neutral and 
Order 
Institutions 
Factor 3:  
Power 
Checking 
Institutions 
Confidence in Parliament .829 .184 .079 
Confidence in Political Parties .782 .036 .150 
Confidence in Government .740 .267 .088 
Confidence in the Civil Service .576 .282 .172 
Confidence in the Army .060 .796 .060 
Confidence in the Police .258 .694 .056 
Confidence in Legal Institutions .282 .639 .241 
Confidence in the Press .153 .118 .887 
Confidence in TV .149 
 
.131 .878 
Explained Variance (Rotation Sums of 
quared loadings) 
26% 19% 19% 
    
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser 
Normalization. 
Table 2 
Trust in Institutions in Sweden (SOM data 1996-2003) 
Number of included respondents: 19,039 
 Factor 1: 
Political/ 
Biased 
Institutions 
Factor 2: 
Neutral and 
Order 
Institutions 
Factor 3:  
Power 
Checking 
Institutions 
Trust in Government .875 .158 .047 
Trust in Parliament .872 .206 .100 
Trust in the Local Government .666 .253 .187 
Trust in the Health System .083 .744 .043 
Trust in the Police .209 .727 .042 
Trust in the Defense System .151 .635 .093 
Trust in Schools .154 .531 .249 
Trust in the Legal System .371 .515 .153 
Trust in Newspapers .127 .101 .831 
Trust in TV .105 .165 .830 
Explained Variance (Rotation Sums of 
squared loadings) 
22% 22% 15% 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser 
Normalization.  
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Figure 2a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2b 
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Table 3: Relationships with Generalized Trust Aggregate Level23
Correlation Table 
 
Variables Correlation N 
   
Socio-political Control Variables   
Protestant Countries versus others religions (Dummy var.) 0.5473* 71 
Ethnic Fractionalization -0.3670* 71 
Religious Fractionalization 0.0333 71 
Former Communist Country -0.3257* 71 
Associational Membership Scale          0.1090              71 
   
Socio-economic Variables   
Gross Domestic Product 0.5964* 68 
Secondary School Enrollment 0.4730* 68 
   
Institutional Variables   
Length of Democracy 0.6591* 71 
Gini Coefficient -0.3646* 69 
Institutional Efficiency 0.6455* 68 
Institutional Impartiality 0.6457* 53 
   
 
* 0.05 of significance 
 
                                                 
23 Includes the second and third wave of the world value survey.  
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Table 4: Institutional Characteristics and Generalized Trust 
 
 
Independents Variables 
 
Baseline 
Model 
Model 
2 
 
Model 
3 
Model 
4 
Model 
5 
Model 
6 
Model 
7 
Model 
8 
Model 
9 
Protestant Dummy .1568** 
(.0476) 
.0782 
(.0419) 
.1642** 
(.0451) 
.1777** 
(.0424) 
.1278** 
(.0446) 
.1497** 
(.0442) 
.1105* 
(.0433) 
.0946* 
(.0440) 
.0877* 
(.0437) 
Ethnic Fractionalization -.1695* -.1234 
(.0844) (.0768) 
-.1157 
(.1002) 
-.1157 
(.1032) 
-.1012 
(.1027) 
-.0808 
(.0822) 
-.0991 
(.1001) 
-.0878 
(.0903) 
-.0773 
(.0868) 
Religious Fractionalization .1078 .0945 
(.0784) 
.0747 
(.0909) 
.0850 
(.0893) 
.0842 
(.0861) 
.0634 
(.0801) 
.0141 
(.0914) 
.0094 
(.0867) 
.0199 
(.0835) (.0851) 
Communist -.0775* .0269 
 (.0357) (.0375) 
-.0140 
(.0354) 
-.0496 
(.0368) 
-.0974* 
(.0424) 
.0049 
(.0393) 
-.0481 
(.0468) 
.0287 
(.0733) 
.0406 
(.0732) 
Associational Membership  -.2045 -.2653 
(.3434) (.3299) 
-.1873 
(.3568) 
-.1078 
(.3317) 
-.0386 
(.3212) 
-.1284 
(.3403) 
-.1624 
(.3499) 
-.2012 
(.3365) 
-.2246 
(.3128) 
          
Length of Democracy  .0036** 
(.0008) 
       
Gross Domestic Product   .0052 
(.0031) 
      
Sec. School Enrollment    .0014 
(.0007) 
     
Gini Index     -.0044* 
(.0021) 
    
Institutional Effectiveness      .0671** 
(.0192) 
 .0757 
(.0493) 
.0791 
(.0501) 
Institutional Index       .0683** 
(.0222) 
-.0088 
(.0485) 
-.0502 
(.0620) 
Interaction Institutional 
Index*Institutional 
Effectiveness 
       .0519* 
(.0221) 
 
Interaction highly efficient 
institutions with impartiality 
(non-efficient institutions 
coded zero) 
        .1455** 
(.0520) 
Constant .3338** 
(.0401) 
.2193** 
(.0351) 
.2520** 
(.0524) 
.1950** 
(.0674) 
.4822** 
(.0854) 
.2639** 
9.0418)
.3584** 
(.0416) 
.2607** 
(.0724) 
.2381** 
(.0747) 
         
 
 
N 
R2 
VIF 
71 
0.3962 
1.32 
71 
.5430 
1.71 
71 
.4890 
1.67 
68 
0.4982 
1.39 
69 
0.4502 
1.44 
68 
0.5239 
53 52 
0.5070 0.5786 
1.71 1.48 3.10 
52 
0.6009 
3.63 
 
 
** 0.01 of Significance & * 0.05 of Significance 
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Table 5: Explaining Generalized Trust—Individual level models  
 Model 124 Model 225 Model 326
 SOM, Sweden 
(1996-2000) 
ESC, Canada 
(2002) 
WVS, 74 countries 
(1990/95) 
Constant 5.16****  
(.12) 
-2.58**** 
(.27) 
-1.63**** 
(.06) 
Education .10**** 
(.01) 
.12**** 
1.13 
(.02) 
.01**** 
1.00 
(.00) 
Age  .10**** 
(.01) 
.01*** 
1.01 
(.00) 
.00**** 
1.00 
(.00) 
Married .10** 
(.04) 
.17** 
1.13 
(.09) 
-.00 
.99 
(.03) 
Unemployed -.28*** 
(.09) 
-.27* 
.76 
(.15) 
-.23**** 
.79 
(.02) 
    
Quebec (francophone)  -1.16**** 
.314 
(.12) 
 
Size of Location27 -.00 
(.00) 
-.22*** 
1.24 
(.06) 
-.03 
.97 
(.02) 
 
Life Satisfaction .53**** 
(.03) 
 .43**** 
1.54 
(.01) 
 
Associational Involvement .84**** 
(.11) 
.30*** 
1.36 
(.09) 
.95**** 
2.58 
(.06) 
 
Institutional Trust in Order .40****  .39**** 
                                                 
24 Model 1 uses OLS regression, as the dependent variable is an 11 point scale. Results show OLS regression 
coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.    
25 Model 2 uses Logit, as the dependent variable is dichotomous. Results show logit coefficients, with odds 
ratios and standard errors in parentheses below.  
26 Model 3 uses Stata’s Svylogit, as individuals are clustered in countries. Results show svylogit coefficients, 
with odds ratios and standard errors in parentheses below.  
27 Size of location is measured slightly differently in the three data sets. In the Swedish survey, villages, small 
towns, large towns and cities are distinguished on a four-point scale. In the Canadian survey small towns and 
rural areas were distinguished from census agglomeration and census metropolitan areas. In the WVS, size of 
location is an 8-point scale (standardized between 0-1), distinguishing the following population sizes: <2000,  
2-5000, 5-10k, 10-20k, 20-50k, 50-100k, 100-500k, 500k+.  
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Institutions (.03) 1.48 
(.04) 
Rating of Courts  .01**** 
1.01 
(.00) 
 
Rating of Police  .00** 
1.00 
(.00) 
 
Political trust in Political 
Institutions or Rating of 
Government 
.22**** 
(.02) 
.00** 
1.00 
(.00) 
.69**** 
1.99 
(.03) 
Adjusted R square 
-2 Log likelihood 
Nagelkerke R square 
.11  
3117.494 
.142 
 
 
N 11,903 2,456 84,006 
Number of aggregate units   74 
 
*=p<.1; **=p<.05; ***=p<.01; ****=p<.001  
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Appendix: Descriptive Statistics Aggregate Data set (WVS, waves 2 & 3 and aggregate stats) 
 
Independents 
Variables 
 
Measurement 
(source and/or  question 
wording) 
Coding Sample 
Mean 
Standa
rd 
Deviati
on 
Minimu
m Value 
Maximum 
Value 
Number 
of 
Countries 
Protestant Dummy Alesina Dataset (2002) Dummy 0.1830 0.3895 0 1 71 
Ethnic 
Fractionalization 
Alesina Dataset 
(2002) 
Heterogeneit
y score 0-1 
0.3128 0.2101 0.0119 0.8505 71 
Religious 
Fractionalization 
Alesina Dataset 
(2002) 
Heterogeneit
y score 0-1 
0.4613 0.1951 0.1350 0.8241 71 
Communist Author’s coding Dummy 0.4085 0.4950 0 1 71 
Associational 
Membership 
WVS 
Participation in Church, 
Sports, Arts, Parties, 
Environmental, Charity, 
Other  
Additive 
Scale 
(Ave. # of 
membership
per country) 
0.2823 0.1838 0 1 71 
Length of 
Democracy 
Length of time country 
has been democratic, as of 
year of WVS wave.  Beck 
et al. 2001.  
Number of 
years 
22.7324 24.9908 0 65 71 
Gross Domestic 
Product 
GDP per capita  
World Bank Data 
Log 10.8099 7.8221 0.7350 29.2250 68 
Sec. School 
Enrollment 
Secondary School 
enrollment  World Bank 
Data28
Scale 83.5702 25.3236 19.1620 142.4888 68 
Gini Index Human Development 
Report 2004 
Index 
(low 
values=low 
inequality) 
35.3797 9.7530 24.4 59.1 69 
Institutional 
Effectiveness 
Government Point 
Estimate - 1996 
Kaufmann et al 2003 
Index 
(low values 
=low 
effective.) 
0.4706 0.9038 -1.05 1.98 68 
Institutional Index IRIS data set (Knack and 
Keefer 1998) 
Index 
(low 
values=low 
impartiality) 
0 0.9346 -1.8922 1.1878 53 
Institut. Index*Inst. 
Effect. 
 Interactive 0.7385 0.8255 -0.7477 2.3518 52 
Interaction dummy 
Inst. Effectiveness 
with impartiality 29
 
 
Interactive 0.3556 0.5355 -0.7870 1.1878 52 
                                                 
28 Gross enrollment ratio is the ratio of total enrollment, regardless of age, to the population of the age group 
that officially corresponds to the level of education shown. Secondary education completes the provision of 
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Descriptive Statistics Individual Level WVS 
 Measurement 
 
Coding Sample 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation
Minimum 
Value 
Maximum 
Value 
Number 
of 
Countries
        
Education Number of 
years of 
education 
Scale 17.3528 6.2286 0 30 87 
Age   Absolute 41.3707 16.1610 18 95 102 
Married Marital Status Dummy 0.7245 0.4468 0 1 104 
Employed Employment 
Status 
Dummy 0.5728 0.4947 0 1 101 
Size of 
Location 
Size of town Standardized 
Scale 
0.5446 0.3557 0 1 89 
Life 
Satisfaction 
Life 
Satisfaction 
Standardized 
Scale 
0.2373 0.5524 -1 1 103 
Number of 
Associational 
Involvement 
(active 
membership) 
Church, 
Sports, Arts, 
Parties, 
Environmental, 
Charity, Other 
Standardized 
scale 
0.4271 0.8575 0 1 105 
Institutional 
Trust in Order 
Institutions 
Standardized 
Score of Army, 
Police and 
Legal System 
Standardized 
Index 
0.5080 0.2332 0 1 102 
Political trust 
in Political 
Institutions or 
Rating of 
Government 
Standardized 
Score of 
Government, 
Parties and 
Parliament 
Standardized 
Index 
0.4145 0.2595 0 1 102 
                                                                                                                                                       
basic education that began at the primary level, and aims at laying the foundations for lifelong learning and 
human development, by offering more subject- or skill-oriented instruction using more specialized 
teachersSource: World Bank World Development Indicators,  "http://www.worldbank.org"  
29 Non-efficient institutions are coded zero.  
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Descriptive Statistics Individual Level ESC data 
 
Variables Sample 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum 
value 
Maximum 
value 
N 
Generalized trust .52 .5 0 1 292330
Education 5.6 2.1 0 10 5071 
Age 45.3 16.3 19 96 5016 
Married ,5526 ,49727 0 1 5152 
Unemployed ,0991 ,29885 0 1 5125 
Francophone (Québecois) .15 .36 0 1 5152 
Size of location 1,58 ,845 1 3 5152 
Accumulative voluntary associational 
membership 
.67 .47 0 1 5152 
Trust in courts 54.5 23.2 0 100 4662 
Trust in police 68.6 20.1 0 100 4949 
Trust in federal government 53.3 21.7 0 100 4875 
Total N listwise deletion     2456 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics SOM Study  
 
Variables Sample 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum 
value 
Maximum
value 
N 
Generalized trust 6,5104 2,37404 0 10 13532 
Education 3,80 2,262 1 7 13779 
Age 52,3057 17,74102 15,00 85,00 14126 
Married ,6905 ,46231 0 1 13780 
Unemployed ,0526 ,22321 0 1 13312 
Size of location 2,53 ,955 1 4 13749 
Life Satisfaction 2.19 ,613 0 3 13720 
Accumulative voluntary associational 
membership 
1,80 ,613 1 4 13720 
Trust in Order Institutions 2,3428 ,82213 0 4 13403 
Trust in political institutions 1,87 ,988 0 4 13507 
Total N listwise deletion     11903 
                                                 
30 Fewer respondents were given the generalized trust question.  
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